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DISABILITY WITHOUT DOCUMENTATION 
Katherine A. Macfarlane* 
 
Disability exists regardless of whether a doctor has confirmed its 
existence.  Yet in the American workplace, employees are not disabled, or 
entitled to reasonable accommodations, until a doctor says so.  This Article 
challenges the assumption that requests for reasonable accommodations 
must be supported by medical proof of disability.  It proposes an 
accommodation process that accepts individuals’ assessments of their 
disabilities and defers to their accommodation preferences.  A 
documentation-free model is not alien to employment law.  In evaluating 
religious accommodations, employers—and courts—take a hands-off 
approach to employees’ representations that their religious beliefs are 
sincere.  Disability deserves the same deference.  This Article also 
contributes a novel analysis of agency guidance by exploring how its support 
of medical documentation requirements conflicts with legislative intent and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act’s rejection of the medical model of 
disability. 
Documenting disability has its price.  It requires access to affordable 
health care and a relationship with a health care provider who is willing to 
confirm a disability’s existence.  Documentation requirements may delay an 
urgently needed accommodation—one that would, for example, permit an 
employee to work from home.  Until documentation requirements are 
relaxed—if not eliminated—disabled employees may be forced to work in 
dangerous conditions, or not work at all. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Disability is idiosyncratic.  It can be intensely private like the early 
morning moments during which an individual with disabilities transfers from 
bed to wheelchair.  Disability can be unavoidably public:  when the same 
person flags down a bus, other passengers bear witness as a platform lift 
raises the wheelchair and its user off the ground.  Disabilities such as visual 
impairments are obvious if they require use of familiar adaptive equipment, 
like white walking sticks.  Disabilities like lupus may hide in plain sight.  To 
some, disability may feel like a prison.  Others believe that disability is a 
gift—a pathway to empathy, a showcase for resilience. 
Like disability, faith is not universal.  It has its private moments like 
solitary, silent prayer.  It has its public moments like a sacrament celebrated 
before friends and family.  Faith may be obvious when it is accompanied by 
specific and identifiable attire, such as a vestment, or it may be invisible to 
others like a crucifix hidden beneath a high-collared shirt.  Faith can be 
confining, or it can be freeing.  Some may hide their religious beliefs, while 
others proudly assert them. 
Disability, like faith, is often shaped by personal experience.  An 
individual may assert that she is disabled because she knows that her spinal 
cord injury is a physical impairment that substantially limits her ability to 
stand and requires the use of a wheelchair.  At work, she may ask for a 
reasonable accommodation that requires the purchase of a desk under which 
a wheelchair will fit.  But an employer need not accept an employee’s 
assertion that her disability requires a wheelchair or accept her 
recommendation that she be given an appropriate desk.  In evaluating a 
request for reasonable accommodations made pursuant to the Americans 
with Disabilities Act1 (ADA), employers may require their disabled 
employees to prove that they are disabled by showing medical 
documentation.  Employers may demand access to employees’ medical 
records and test results or require detailed doctor’s notes.  If an employee 
asserts that she is disabled but cannot provide sufficient medical 
documentation to support her claim, her assertions are meaningless. 
Not all requests for workplace accommodations are so closely scrutinized.  
An employee assigned to work on Saturday may ask to work a different day 
to accommodate his religious practices if the employee believes, as a result 
of his faith, that Saturday is a day of rest.  In most instances, the employee 
will not be required to document his religious beliefs to support the 
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
and 47 U.S.C.). 
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accommodation request.  The employee’s beliefs need not be held by all 
members of the employee’s faith.  Whether the employee is doctrinally 
correct in his interpretation of the commands of his faith is also irrelevant.  
Religious beliefs are hands-off. 
This Article uses the law of workplace accommodation to examine why 
employees must submit documentation to demonstrate that they are disabled 
but need not document their religious beliefs. 
The need to revolutionize reasonable accommodations is urgent.  First, the 
documentation-heavy reasonable accommodation process may be so onerous 
that it contributes to the underemployment of people with disabilities.2  The 
medical documentation requirement is likely influenced by the widespread 
belief that people who claim disability are faking it.  Doron Dorfman explains 
that American society suffers from a moral panic he labels the “fear of the 
disability con.”3  This fear leads to “[t]he second-guessing of a person’s 
disability and of that person’s need for an accommodation.”4  As a result, 
people with disabilities must constantly prove that they are disabled.5  The 
proof required by the reasonable accommodation process may force 
individuals with disabilities to work without the accommodations they need 
to succeed or simply not work at all.6  Disability itself is already significantly 
 
 2. See Katie Eyer, Claiming Disability, 101 B.U. L. REV. 547, 561 (2021) (stating that 
“employment levels of people with disabilities remain very low, despite the desire of many 
people with disabilities to be employed”); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Mothers with Disabilities, 
33 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 75, 77–78 (2018) (explaining that employment was key to 
realizing the ADA’s equal opportunity goal but that individuals with disabilities are still 
employed “at a much lower rate than nondisabled individuals”). 
 3. Doron Dorfman, Fear of the Disability Con:  Perceptions of Fraud and Special Rights 
Discourse, 53 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1051, 1051 (2019). 
 4. Id. at 1078. 
 5. See id. at 1079.  The Trump administration also appeared to be motivated by fear of 
the disability con. See Robert Pear, On Disability and on Facebook?:  Uncle Sam Wants to 
Watch What You Post, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/03/10/us/politics/social-security-disability-trump-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/ 
ZYA2-GQPC].  It threatened to surveil the social media posts of individuals receiving Social 
Security disability benefits in search of evidence that those who claimed to be disabled were 
actually active and happy—behavior supposedly inconsistent with disability. See id.  The 
Trump administration also proposed subjecting recipients of Social Security disability benefits 
to frequent eligibility reviews, which the administration justified as a way of identifying 
disability fraud. See Jake Johnson, Applause as Biden Withdraws ‘Horrific’ Trump Rule 
Attacking Social Security Disability Recipients, COMMON DREAMS (Jan. 28, 2021), 
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2021/01/28/applause-biden-withdraws-horrific-
trump-rule-attacking-social-security-disability [https://perma.cc/44UP-J7DP].  On January 
28, 2021, the Biden administration abandoned any such effort. See id. 
 6. See, e.g., Susan G. Goldberg et al., The Disclosure Conundrum:  How People with 
Psychiatric Disabilities Navigate Employment, 11 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 463, 468 (2005) 
(describing how difficult the reasonable accommodations process can be for employees with 
hidden disabilities who must disclose the nature of their disabilities, a decision that “entails 
substantial risk to their careers” (quoting Sharon L. Harlan & Pamela M. Robert, The Social 
Construction of Disability in Organizations:  Why Employers Resist Reasonable 
Accommodation, 25 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 397, 411 (1998))); David B. Goldstein, Ethical 
Implications of the Learning-Disabled Lawyer, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 114–15 (2000) 
(describing how a newly hired disabled attorney who requests reasonable accommodations 
may fear “ostracism, less responsibility and assumptions about incompetence” and explaining 
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underclaimed by those who might in theory benefit from civil rights 
protections.7 
Second, certain workplaces may be unsafe for people whose disabilities 
place them at high risk of severe cases of COVID-19.  Streamlining the 
reasonable accommodation process, and separating it from medical 
documentation, would permit a new class of employees to continue to work 
safely from home.8 
Almost one in four adult workers in the United States are at risk of severe 
illness from COVID-19, including those who have asthma.9  Though asthma 
is a disability recognized by the ADA,10 before the pandemic, an individual 
with asthma may have given little thought to reasonable accommodations.  
Now, since asthma may increase the risk of severe illness from COVID-19,11 
employees with asthma or others who are high-risk may seek a reasonable 
accommodation permitting them to work from home.12  But 
work-from-home requests are not automatically granted, even during a 
pandemic.13  Employees may be required to prove, with a doctor’s note, that 
their need to work from home is real.14 
On March 27, 2020, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) held a webinar concerning the application of federal equal 
opportunity laws, including the ADA, during the pandemic.15  The EEOC 
explained that employees with disabilities that put them at “greater risk of 
severe illness” if they contract COVID-19 may qualify for a reasonable 
 
that if accommodations are not sought and disability is instead hidden, “the decision . . . may 
doom the attorney to failure by not getting the necessary support staff assistance, supervision 
or technical support”). 
 7. See Eyer, supra note 2, at 551–52 (stating that society’s continued association of 
disability with “functional incapacity and an inability to work” may be the cause of this 
hesitancy to claim disability). 
 8. Of course, many high-risk employees are also essential workers or otherwise unable 
to complete their work at home. 
 9. See Gary Claxton et al., Almost One in Four Adult Workers is Vulnerable to Severe 
Illness from COVID-19, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 15, 2020), https://www.kff.org/ 
coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/almost-one-in-four-adult-workers-is-vulnerable-to-severe-
illness-from-covid-19/ [http://perma.cc/6V84-QVN5]. 
 10. See, e.g., Shine v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 19-cv-04347, 2020 WL 5604048, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2020) (stating that “asthma can substantially limit one’s ability to engage 
in the major life activity of breathing and thus constitute a disability under the ADA”). 
 11. See COVID-19:  People with Certain Medical Conditions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-
precautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html [http://perma.cc/98XY-EN2L] (last 
updated May 13, 2021). 
 12. See Transcript of March 27, 2020 Outreach Webinar, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/transcript-march-27-2020-outreach-webinar#q17 
[http://perma.cc/3J4K-5TTJ] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021). 
 13. See, e.g., Claudia Bellofatto, University of Florida Professors Speak Out on In-Person 
Classes Controversy, WCJB (Nov. 23, 2020, 7:27 PM), https://www.wcjb.com/2020/11/24/ 
university-of-florida-professors-speak-out-on-in-person-classes-controversy/ 
[https://perma.cc/8XKH-32YP]. 
 14. See Transcript of March 27, 2020 Outreach Webinar, supra note 12. 
 15. See id. 
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accommodation pursuant to the ADA.16  It also addressed medical 
documentation requirements but did not suspend them.17  Instead, the EEOC 
cautioned that “many doctors may have difficulty responding quickly” and 
that disabilities can be verified in other ways—for example, with “a health 
insurance record or a prescription.”18 
This Article is the first to question whether requests for reasonable 
accommodation in the workplace must be supported by medical 
documentation of disability.  It proceeds in three parts.  Following this 
introduction, Part I describes the ADA’s rejection of the medical model of 
disability and the way the reasonable accommodation requirement, in 
particular, embodies the ADA’s commitment to the social model of 
disability.  Part I then explores how employers and courts, with the support 
of agency guidance, have nevertheless refused to recognize disability or 
adopt an employee’s proposed accommodations without supporting medical 
documentation.  It contributes a novel analysis of agency guidance, exploring 
how the EEOC’s medical documentation framework contradicts legislative 
intent. 
In Part II, this Article proposes a simple solution:  applying the hands-off 
approach courts currently take with respect to religious beliefs to disability.  
Part II reconceptualizes disability-based accommodations, envisioning a 
process in which an employee’s representation that they are disabled 
establishes that they are disabled.  The Article concludes by explaining how 
centering the experiences of individuals with disabilities might also 
revolutionize how reasonable accommodations are treated in education and 
beyond. 
I.  DOCUMENTING DISABILITY AT WORK 
This part reviews the ADA’s embrace of the social model of disability.  It 
explains how Title I of the ADA, which governs employment, illustrates the 
ADA’s commitment to the social model.  This part also describes the ADA 
drafters’ vision of the “interactive process,” which would be used to identify 
appropriate reasonable accommodations.  Moreover, this part highlights that 
legislative history makes no mention of medical documentation.  This part 
next explores how courts have nevertheless converted the interactive process 
into a medical inquisition.  Finally, it attributes this error to interpretive 
guidance concerning the ADA’s medical inquiries and examinations 
provisions. 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id.  The EEOC suggested that employers provide requested accommodations on a 
temporary basis “where the request is for telework or leave from an employee whose disability 
puts them at higher risk.” Id. 
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A.  Divorcing Disability from the Medical Model 
Like the Civil Rights Act of 1964,19 the ADA was designed to bring about 
a “culture shift.”20  A radical approach was necessary to end disabled 
Americans’ second-class citizenship.  Indeed, the ADA’s legislative history 
is replete with examples of disabled Americans’ underprivileged status, 
including their poverty.21 
Data regarding disabled Americans’ unemployment confirmed the need 
for the ADA’s employment provisions.22  A 1986 poll revealed that about 
two-thirds of working-age individuals with disabilities were unemployed, a 
rate exceeding that “of all other demographic groups under age sixty-five of 
any significant size.”23  The same poll documented that most nonworking 
people with disabilities wanted to work.24  Committee reports noted that 
“about 8.2 million people with disabilities want to work but cannot find a 
job.”25 
Gainful employment is key to independence and dignity, and it is essential 
to facilitating self-sufficiency.26  After all, “[a] good job contributes to our 
self-worth, offers membership in a community, provides benefits like health 
insurance, and is critical to financial stability and independence.”27  
Inaccessible workplaces made gainful employment impossible for 
individuals with disabilities.  To meaningfully impact unemployment, the 
ADA would need to permanently alter the American workplace. 
The ADA aimed to change the workplace in two ways.  First, it prohibited 
adverse employment decisions based on disability.28  Second, unlike 
 
 19. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 20. Louis S. Rulli & Jason A. Leckerman, Unfinished Business:  The Fading Promise of 
ADA Enforcement in the Federal Courts Under Title I and Its Impact on the Poor, 8 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 595, 599 (2005).  The disability rights movement was informed by the African 
American civil rights movement and borrowed its ingenuous strategies. See Laura L. Rovner, 
Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1059 (2004) (explaining that 
“disability advocates have ‘employ[ed] the language from [other civil rights] movements, 
decrying patterns of hierarchy and subordination based upon physical differences’” 
(alterations in original) (quoting Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 621, 660 (1999))). 
 21. See, e.g., Arlene Mayerson, Title I—Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 499, 499 (1991). 
 22. See id. 
 23. Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act:  Analysis and 
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 
420 (1991). 
 24. Id. at 421. 
 25. Id. at 422 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 9 (1989)). 
 26. See, e.g., Hostettler v. Coll. of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 857 (6th Cir. 2018) (stating 
that the ADA was concerned with providing individuals with disabilities gainful employment 
to facilitate “dignity, financial independence, and self-sufficiency”). 
 27. Alison Barkoff & Emily B. Read, Employment of People with Disabilities:  Recent 
Successes and an Uncertain Future, 42 HUM. RTS., no. 4, 2017, at 8, 8. 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (defining the term “discriminate against a qualified 
individual on the basis of disability” as including “limiting, segregating, or classifying a job 
applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such 
applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee”). 
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traditional civil rights laws, the ADA also imposed an affirmative obligation 
on employers, requiring that they “assist employees in satisfactorily 
performing the essential functions of the job” by making reasonable 
accommodations in the workplace.29  Therefore, failing to make a reasonable 
accommodation for an applicant or employee who is “otherwise qualified” 
constitutes disability discrimination prohibited by the ADA.30 
Carrie Griffin Basas has described the ADA as a “social project” that 
would “dismantle the systemic economic and employment discrimination 
faced by people with disabilities in all work settings.”31  Reasonable 
accommodations would accomplish the repurposing of the American 
workplace.32  After all, as Mark Weber has explained, the accommodation 
mandate “requires changes in the way things have always been done in order 
to permit people with disabilities to integrate into society on a plane equal to 
that of others.”33 
Employers are required to make reasonable accommodations when an 
individual with disabilities seeks employment, and employers must also 
provide access to the privileges associated with employment.34  If an 
employer provides “cafeterias, lounges, gymnasiums, auditoriums, 
transportation and the like,” each must be accessible.35  In some cases, 
making reasonable accommodations may require employers to implement 
physical or structural changes.36  For example, an employer may need to 
provide a ramp for an employee who uses a wheelchair.37  Making reasonable 
accommodations may also alter how a job is performed by, for example, 
“reallocating or redistributing marginal job functions that an employee is 
unable to perform because of a disability” or “altering when and/or how a 
function, essential or marginal, is performed.”38 
The duty to make reasonable accommodations is only owed to employees 
who are qualified, defined by the ADA as those who “with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
 
 29. Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act:  Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1045, 1047–48 (2000). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 31. Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable Accommodation and 
Resistance Under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59, 67 (2008). 
 32. Id. at 67. 
 33. Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 
1119, 1122 (2010). 
 34. See Mayerson, supra note 21, at 516. 
 35. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., § 1630.9 (2020). 
 36. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating 
that the ADA may require altering employers’ “difficult-to-navigate restrooms and 
hard-to-open doors”). 
 37. See Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, 
and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 880 (2006). 
 38. Enforcement Guidance:  Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the 
American with Disabilities Act, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002), 2002 WL 
31994335. 
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employment position that such individual holds or desires.”39  Also, 
employers are not required to make accommodations that would impose an 
undue hardship on a business’s operation.40 
The ADA does not describe how accommodations are to be identified and 
implemented.41  However, courts have uniformly required employers and 
employees to engage in what is termed the “interactive process” to determine 
what accommodations will be made.42  Scholars have traced the interactive 
process to a 1989 Senate committee report.43  The report envisioned a 
“problem-solving approach” to accommodations.44  It emphasized that the 
employee’s experience and knowledge should be centered.  For example, the 
report provided that “[a]fter receiving a request for an accommodation by an 
employee, employers are encouraged to solicit suggestions for reasonable 
accommodations from the employee/applicant.”45  It also highlighted how an 
employee’s accommodation suggestion “is often simpler and less expensive 
than the accommodation the employer may have envisioned, resulting in a 
win-win situation for the employee and employer.”46 
According to the report, a more involved process is required only if “the 
person with the disability is not familiar enough with the job and the 
employer is not familiar enough with the disability to devise an appropriate 
accommodation.”47  In that scenario, the report envisioned a process that 
would first identify the “barriers to equal opportunity.”48  Employer and 
employee would then work together to identify “the essential and 
nonessential tasks of the position” and “the abilities and limitations of the 
employee,” settling on “tasks or aspects of the job that the employee is 
precluded from performing effectively.”49  Next, “possible accommodations 
must be identified.”50  Again, the employee’s preferences control.  The report 
 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).  Relevant regulations arguably define “qualified” more 
narrowly. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2020) (defining a qualified employee as one who 
“satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the 
employment position such individual holds or desires” and can, “with or without reasonable 
accommodation, . . . perform the essential functions of such position”). 
 40. See Mayerson, supra note 21, at 513–14.  A discussion of what constitutes an undue 
hardship is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 41. See Dallan F. Flake, Interactive Religious Accommodations, 71 ALA. L. REV. 67, 74 
(2019).  Flake argues that the ADA’s interactive process should be required in the religious 
accommodations context. See id. at 107–14; see also infra Part III.A (discussing Flake’s 
argument). 
 42. Flake, supra note 41, at 74. 
 43. The ADA’s “committee reports were considered extensively and relied upon as an 
accurate statement of the meaning of the ADA,” which “reflects a very open and honest 
legislative debate.” Ruth Colker, The ADA’s Journey Through Congress, 39 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1, 47 (2004); Flake, supra note 41, at 74. 
 44. Flake, supra note 41, at 74 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 34 (1989)); see also 
Mayerson, supra note 21, at 515–16. 
 45. Mayerson, supra note 21, at 515 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 34). 
 46. Flake, supra note 41, at 74. 
 47. Mayerson, supra note 21, at 516. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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instructed employers to “first consult the employee, followed by 
consultations with various employment agencies familiar with the needs of 
disabled workers.”51  The Senate report does not contemplate resorting to 
medical documentation during the interactive process.  The present approach 
to reasonable accommodations ignores this key legislative history, instead 
mandating an experience that is punitive, adversarial, and humiliating.  The 
present approach betrays the drafters’ vision. 
In 1991, the EEOC issued regulations implementing Title I of the ADA, 
which provided that an interactive process “may be necessary” to determine 
“the appropriate reasonable accommodation.”52  The regulations explained 
that the interactive process “should identify the precise limitations resulting 
from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could 
overcome those limitations.”53  The regulations also do not reference 
providing medical documentation of disability during the interactive process.  
Whereas the regulations provide that the interactive process “may” be 
necessary, the EEOC’s interpretive guidance states that “[t]he appropriate 
reasonable accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive 
process that involves both the employer and the individual with a 
disability.”54  The process outlined by the guidance “closely tracks” the 
process outlined by the Senate Committee report “but places even greater 
emphasis on the employee’s role in the process.”55  Indeed, the EEOC 
requires that an employer consult with an employee “not only to identify 
possible accommodations but also to assess their potential effectiveness.”56  
If “two equally effective accommodations are available,” the EEOC gives the 
employee’s preference “primary consideration.”57 
If consultation with the employee does not identify feasible 
accommodations, the employer is directed to consider whether “technical 
assistance” may help determine “how to accommodate the particular 
individual in the specific situation.”58  Technical assistance “could be sought 
from the Commission, from State or local rehabilitation agencies, or from 
disability constituent organizations.”59 
Like the ADA’s legislative history and relevant regulations, the EEOC’s 
guidance does not reference medical documentation in its description of the 
interactive process.  The employee’s own suggestions regarding 
accommodations serve as the starting point.  Healthcare providers are not 
identified as individuals from whom technical expertise might be sought. 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2020). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Flake, supra note 41, at 76 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1630, app., § 1630.9 (2019)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 77. 
 57. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., § 1630.9 (2019)). 
 58. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., § 1630.9 (2020). 
 59. Id. 
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This Article reveals the central role health care providers and medical 
records play in the interactive process, despite the legislative history, 
regulations, and guidance that treat a disabled person’s expertise as 
controlling.  In addition to this conflict, reliance on health care providers and 
medical records converts the interactive process into one that is steeped in 
the medical model of disability. 
The drafters of the ADA intended to reject the medical model, which 
focuses on diagnoses, treatment, and rehabilitation.  The medical model 
sidelines individuals with disabilities, giving them little say over their own 
identities.  Before the ADA’s passage, federal disability law and policy 
“focused on changing, fixing, or training the disabled person to help him 
overcome his disability and adapt to the ways of ‘normal’ society.”60  
Disability was treated as a biological condition.  Pursuant to the medical 
model, a disabled individual is helped through either “rehabilitation efforts 
to enable the individual to overcome the effects of the disability, or medical 
efforts to find a cure for the individual.”61  The medical model perceives an 
individual’s disability as “personal misfortune” with no social cause.62 
The medical model of disability grants tremendous power to health care 
professionals.  Physicians “validate the existence of disability” and serve as 
gatekeepers to social assistance.63  Pursuant to the medical model, “[t]he 
individual’s own subjective experience of impairment or limitation is 
irrelevant unless it can be professionally validated.”64  Validation requires a 
physician, who alone can “diagnose or categorize the cause of an 
impairment” and also “measure and document its functional impact.”65 
The ADA’s modern view of disability “is a dramatic change in 
perspective, from a medical state to be cured and pitied, or tolerated when 
‘worthy,’ towards acceptance and accommodation of difference as part of the 
human experience and individual identity.”66  The ADA conceptualizes 
disability through a social model, in which disability is a “multi-faceted 
societal oppression . . . distinguished from the physiological notion of 
impairment.”67 
 
 60. Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 
GA. L. REV. 27, 56 (2000). 
 61. Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”:  The Entrenchment of the 
Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 186 (2008). 
 62. See id. 
 63. Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 650 
(1999). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Peter Blanck, Why America Is Better Off Because of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 35 TOURO L. REV. 605, 609 (2019). 
 67. Areheart, supra note 61, at 188; see also Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry 
in Antidiscrimination Law, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 69, 120 (“[T]he ADA was meant to create a 
new way of thinking about disability—that those with disabilities are not intrinsically limited, 
but instead have been held back by environmental features that can be changed.”). 
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This social model of disability treats the obstacles encountered by the 
disabled as “social structures and practices” which society should remedy.68  
As Carrie Griffin Basas explains, the social model of disability “promotes 
the idea that people with disabilities become disabled by societal perceptions 
of their difference or ‘deviance’ from the norm, rather than by any intrinsic 
difference in worth, ability, or potential.”69  Disability is a social construct 
“crafted and advanced by non-disabled people,” who influence society’s 
“architecture and infrastructure.”70  If institutions and structures are not 
designed for universal access, accounting for “the spectrum of human needs 
and ways of doing things,” they will exclude anyone who does not “look, act, 
think, move, read, or behave ‘normally.’”71 
Title I’s requirement that employers make reasonable accommodations 
reflects the social model.  It “calls for employers to recognize that they 
collectively have created an employment environment that makes some 
mental and physical conditions disabling.”72 
Writing in 2007, Deidre Smith found that in most ADA litigation, plaintiffs 
must introduce medical evidence to prove that they are disabled so they can 
avoid summary judgment.73  The insistence on medical proof of disability 
reinforces a “deep-seated skepticism of those ‘claiming disability’ generally 
and ADA plaintiffs specifically.”74  In 2008, Brad Areheart theorized that the 
medical model of disability remained entrenched and that the ADA’s social 
view of disability was only a “symbolic victory” over the medical model.75  
“Despite the ADA’s conceptual bent,” Areheart explained, “a social view of 
disability has not taken root in America.”76 
Over ten years later, the medical model of disability endures.  As explained 
below, the medical model shapes the interactive process.  When disabled 
employees do not provide medical documentation of disability, courts hold 
that they have not participated in good faith in the interactive process and 
therefore cannot bring failure-to-accommodate claims against their 
employers.  An employer need not accommodate disabled employees who 
cannot back up their self-proclaimed disabilities with medical proof. 
 
 68. Areheart, supra note 61, at 189. 
 69. Basas, supra note 31, at 95–96. 
 70. See id. at 96. 
 71. Rovner, supra note 20, at 1062. 
 72. Elizabeth Dalton, The Overall Financial Interest of Individuals with Disabilities:  
Justifying the Motivating Factor Standard, 12 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 231, 247 (2016); see also 
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 435 
(2000) (“By requiring individualized accommodation, these provisions . . . remove socially 
contingent barriers to the full integration of people with physical and mental impairments.”). 
 73. See Deirdre M. Smith, Who Says You’re Disabled?:  The Role of Medical Evidence in 
the ADA Definition of Disability, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Areheart, supra note 61, at 183. 
 76. Id. at 192. 
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B.  Medical Documentation and the Interactive Process 
Failure-to-accommodate cases reveal the sharp contrast between how the 
interactive process was intended to function and how it actually proceeds.  
The cases discussed below demonstrate that though conceived as informal, 
the interactive process through which employers evaluate employees’ 
reasonable accommodation requests has become burdensomely formal for 
the disabled employees.  In practice, employees cannot explain what their 
own “precise limitations” are, nor can they suggest “potential reasonable 
accommodations,” as the ADA’s legislative history recommends.  Rather, a 
medical provider, typically a doctor, must verify that an employee is disabled 
and identify what accommodations are needed. 
A failure to provide medical documentation of disability during the 
interactive process has significant legal consequences.  When disabled 
employees do not provide their employers with medical documentation, 
employers need not provide requested accommodations, and the interactive 
process ends.  Courts assign responsibility for a breakdown in the interactive 
process to disabled employees who fail to provide medical documentation of 
their disabilities.77  When an employee is deemed responsible for this kind 
of breakdown, the employee cannot claim disability discrimination based on 
a failure to accommodate. 
When courts assess failure-to-accommodate claims, suspicion abounds 
about whether an employee is in fact disabled and entitled to 
accommodations.  The leading cases described below highlight courts’ 
willingness to doubt employees’ accounts of their disabilities.  The cases 
underscore the belief that a failure to provide medical documentation of 
disability is suggestive of disability fraud.78  The documentation-heavy 
interactive process that courts endorse bears almost no resemblance to the 
employee-centric process outlined by the ADA’s legislative history and 
relevant guidance. 
The oft-cited EEOC v. Prevo’s Family Market, Inc.79 is emblematic.  
There, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a grocery store did not violate the 
ADA when it required employee Steven Sharp, a produce clerk who 
informed Prevo’s that he was HIV positive, to submit to a medical 
examination to confirm his diagnosis.80  Prevo’s endorses an employer’s 
refusal to accept an employee’s own assertion that he is disabled. 
 
 77. See Stacy A. Hickox & Keenan Case, Risking Stigmatization to Gain Accommodation, 
22 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 533, 573 (2020) (“An employee’s failure to provide requested medical 
information is commonly used to justify either an employer’s termination of the interactive 
process and/or the employee’s discharge.”); see also John F. Birmingham, Jr., The Interactive 
Accommodation Process:  Cooperate or Pay the Price, 77 MICH. BAR J. 1044, 1045 (1998). 
 78. See Dorfman, supra note 3, at 1055 (explaining how “the suspicion of fakery has been 
engrained in the legal treatment of disability”).  Dorfman found that “the suspicion of 
disability con has a pernicious effect on the lives of many people with disabilities.” Id. at 1079.  
“People with disabilities often need to prove their disabilities daily, not only to health 
professionals or judges but also to ordinary people,” a process that “takes its toll.” Id. 
 79. 135 F.3d 1089 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 80. Id. at 1090–91. 
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In January 1993, Sharp informed his employers that he planned to speak 
at a local high school event focused on AIDS awareness.81  Because the 
children of several Prevo’s employees attended the school, Sharp shared his 
HIV status with Prevo’s to ensure that his employer would hear the news 
first.82  Following a conversation with the grocery chain’s president 
regarding Sharp’s HIV status, Sharp was reassigned from the produce area 
to the store’s receiving area.83  After his transfer, other employees asked 
questions about his reassignment and commented about their “disrupted 
work schedules.”84  To “get Sharp out of the situation of being asked 
questions and to give Prevo’s a chance to get the information that they needed 
to properly handle the situation,” Sharp and Prevo’s agreed that Sharp would 
be placed on paid leave.85 
While discussing his leave of absence, “Sharp promised his employer that 
he would obtain verification of his HIV condition from his personal 
physician and furnish the information to his employer.”86  By November 
1993, Sharp had yet to provide the promised information.87  Prevo’s asked 
Sharp to submit to a medical examination by an infectious disease expert at 
Prevo’s expense.88  Prevo’s wanted the expert, Dr. Baumgartner, to assess 
whether “future treatment would require Sharp to be absent from work” and 
“whether Prevo’s should consider assigning Sharp to office work.”89  Prevo’s 
also wanted the expert to provide an opinion about “the transmittal of HIV 
on tools and produce” and “the degree of risk Sharp posed to customers and 
co-workers in the produce position.”90  Despite Sharp’s assertion that he was 
HIV positive, Prevo’s also wanted Dr. Baumgartner to “provide a complete 
diagnosis and prognosis concerning whether Sharp tested positive for HIV,” 
as well as “hepatitis or any related conditions.”91 
Though he was never examined by Dr. Baumgartner, Sharp provided a 
letter from his physician confirming his negative hepatitis and tuberculosis 
tests.92  Prevo’s deemed the information insufficient as it did not address 
Sharp’s HIV “diagnosis, prognosis, or suitability for employment.”93  In 
 
 81. Id. at 1091. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  While recounting these facts, the court interjects commentary that undercuts 
Sharp’s experience, writing that “[i]t was not at all clear why Sharp experienced discomfort 
at being asked about the reason for the change in his work assignment since Sharp had 
indicated his desire to perform public speaking in connection with an AIDS awareness and 
education program.” Id.  The court cannot imagine that an employee may wish to speak about 
his disability on his own terms in a supportive environment, as opposed to being subjected to 
intrusive questions in the workplace.  There is a difference. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1091–92. 
 88. Id. at 1092. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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December 1993, after refusing to schedule an appointment with Dr. 
Baumgartner, Sharp was terminated.94 
At issue in Prevo’s was the ADA’s general prohibition on 
employer-mandated medical examinations and inquiries that seek to establish 
that an employee “is an individual with a disability” or to obtain information 
about “the nature or severity of the disability.”95  Such examinations or 
inquiries are only permitted when they are “job-related and consistent with 
business necessity.”96  According to Prevo’s, a medical examination would 
determine whether Sharp “could safely perform the function of his job 
involving cuts and scrapes without exposing others to HIV infection.”97  The 
EEOC argued that a medical examination was unnecessary, as the same 
information could be obtained from the employee himself or by consulting 
health care officials.98  But the Sixth Circuit agreed with Prevo’s.  A 
“significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by 
reasonable accommodation” is a direct threat.99  The court explained that 
“[b]ecause of the frequency of bleeding in the produce area, Prevo’s needed 
to verify Sharp’s medical condition, determine whether he had other 
conditions associated with HIV, and determine whether he was aware of and 
able to follow safety procedures to reduce or eliminate any risk of 
infection.”100 Therefore, Prevo’s could require Sharp to submit to a medical 
examination because the examination would determine whether he posed a 
“significant risk to the health or safety of others” that could not be eliminated 
by reasonable accommodation.101 
Prevo’s addresses what an employer may require of an employee when the 
employer believes that the employee may pose a direct threat to others in the 
workplace.102  It is not a case about the interactive process, as Sharp never 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Prevo’s, 135 F.3d at 1095. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. (first citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3); then citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1996)). 
 100. Id. at 1094.  This statement was powerfully countered in Judge Kimberly A. Moore’s 
dissent, which noted that since the ADA’s enactment, “neither HIV nor AIDS has ever 
appeared on the list of infectious diseases that could be communicated through the handling 
of food,” choosing “fear, prejudice, and ignorance” instead of medical evidence. Id. at 1099–
100. 
 101. Id. at 1101 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3)).  An employer does not commit disability 
discrimination when the employer denies a job or benefit to an individual with a disability 
who poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others in the workplace. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12113(a), (b); see also Elisa Y. Lee, Note, An American Way of Life:  Prescription Drug 
Use in the Modern ADA Workplace, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 303, 324–25 (2011) 
(“Courts have consistently recognized that a person cannot be considered a qualified 
individual with a disability under the ADA if the person poses a direct threat to the health or 
safety of others in the workplace that cannot be eliminated by a reasonable accommodation.”). 
 102. For a discussion of the court’s direct threat analysis, see Rebecca Trapp, Medical 
Examination or Objective Medical Evidence:  What Is the Correct Procedure to Determine If 
an Employee Infected with the HIV Virus Presents a Direct Threat Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act—EEOC v. Prevo’s Family Market, Inc., 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1585, 1586–
87 (1999). 
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asked for a reasonable accommodation.103  Still, Prevo’s mentions 
accommodations in dicta, stating that an employer “need not take the 
employee’s word . . . that the employee has an illness that may require special 
accommodation.”104  Though not germane to its holding, this statement has 
had a lasting impact on reasonable accommodation law. 
The case explains why an employee’s own account of disability should not 
suffice, warning that “[i]f this were not the case, every employee could claim 
a disability warranting a special accommodation yet deny the employer the 
opportunity to confirm whether a need for the accommodation exists.”105  
The court characterized documentation of disability as essential to 
“employer-employee co-operation” and stated that it would “promote an 
interactive dialogue between an employer and employee to discover to what 
extent the employee is disabled and how the employee may be 
accommodated, if at all, in the workplace.”106 
Prevo’s not only suggests that an employee’s own statement that they are 
disabled is not sufficient but also further treats as a lie Sharp’s claim that he 
is HIV positive.107  Despite Sharp’s statement that he was HIV positive, the 
court contended that “it is unknown by all of the parties that have ever been 
associated with this case whether Sharp is HIV positive.”108 
Prevo’s has been criticized on several grounds.109  It is an opinion that 
reads at best as dated and, at worst, as representative of the thinly veiled 
homophobia surrounding HIV and AIDS.  And, as the dissenting opinion 
emphasized, information about the “likelihood and imminence of infection 
could be determined without resort to a medical examination of Sharp.”110  
Rather than requiring a medical examination, Prevo’s could have consulted 
with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.111 
Far less attention has been paid to the pronouncement in Prevo’s that an 
“employer need not take the employee’s word for it that the employee has an 
illness that may require special accommodation.”112  Though rooted in the 
court’s desire to malign Sharp and discredit his representations about his own 
health, this aspect of Prevo’s survives.  It has taken on a life of its own, 
despite its problematic origins. The language has been used to justify medical 
 
 103. Prevo’s, 135 F.3d at 1097 (expressly declining to address Prevo’s argument that there 
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 106. Id. at 1095. 
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examinations and inquiries outside of the direct threat context.  It is arguably 
one of the most influential—and harmful—federal Title I opinions. 
Yet, over time, Prevo’s has been repackaged as an interactive process 
case.113  The Southern District of Ohio has cited Prevo’s in holding that “[n]o 
discrimination occurs where employment is terminated as a result of an 
employee’s refusal to engage in the interactive process” by refusing to submit 
to a medical examination.114  The Eastern District of Tennessee has cited 
Prevo’s in support of its conclusion that an employee impeded the interactive 
process when the defendant employer “requested substantiating medical 
information, and plaintiff did not provide it.”115  The Western District of 
Kentucky has cited Prevo’s in connection with its conclusion that defendant 
employers did not violate the ADA “by requiring medical proof of her need 
for accommodations.”116 
The Fifth Circuit has cited Prevo’s in assessing whether an employee 
participated in the interactive process.117  Prevo’s has also been cited in 
reasonable accommodation cases decided by district courts outside of the 
Sixth Circuit.118  The Sixth Circuit itself has quoted and misapplied Prevo’s, 
using its proviso that an employee’s own contention that the employee is 
disabled need not be taken at face value in the context of the interactive 
process.119 
Just as Prevo’s endorses rejecting employees’ claims that they are 
disabled, courts have also rejected failure-to-accommodate claims when the 
accommodations were suggested by the employee instead of a doctor.  In 
both instances, the employee-centric approach envisioned by the ADA’s 
legislative history, regulations, and interpretive guidance has been 
abandoned.  For example, in Reyes v. Krasdale Foods, Inc.,120 the court 
rejected a failure-to-accommodate claim because the disabled employee’s 
requested accommodation was not specifically supported by documentation 
provided by the employee’s doctor.121  Wilfredo Reyes brought a 
 
 113. See Sloan v. Repacorp, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 891, 900 (S.D. Ohio 2018). 
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 120. 945 F. Supp. 2d 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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failure-to-accommodate claim alleging that his employer, Krasdale, 
“improperly denied his request to shift his schedule forward by thirty 
minutes, from a 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. shift, to a 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 
shift.”122  The schedule shift was Reyes’s preferred accommodation and the 
one he suggested.123 
The parties agreed that Reyes was disabled as a result of Type 1 
diabetes.124  The thirty-minute schedule change would have permitted Reyes 
to administer an injection that rendered him dizzy and nauseous while he was 
at home, instead of forcing him to inject himself while driving home.125  
Reyes’s doctor had advised him “to alter his meal and injection schedule to 
achieve the best results.”126  However, because Reyes did not believe he had 
to provide his employer with “details about his medical condition,” the 
doctor’s note Reyes provided to Krasdale stated that Krasdale should 
“accommodate [plaintiff’s] working hours” but did not recommend a specific 
adjustment.127 
The court found that, despite the doctor’s note, Reyes failed to provide 
sufficient medical documentation justifying the schedule change.128  The 
letter did not state that Reyes’s work schedule should be altered “for 
whatever variety of reasons,” and, therefore, Krasdale did not have enough 
medical documentation to agree to the thirty-minute accommodation.129  
That is, despite agreeing that the plaintiff was disabled and receiving a note 
from a health care provider recommending schedule alterations, the employer 
was excused from granting a request to change the employee’s schedule by 
thirty minutes. 
Courts have also denied failure-to-accommodate claims even though 
disabled employees provided medical documentation of disability on the 
grounds that the documentation provided was insufficient.  In Beck v. 
University of Wisconsin Board of Regents,130 the Seventh Circuit blamed 
Lorraine Beck for the breakdown of the interactive process.131  It rejected her 
claim that the University of Wisconsin failed to reasonably accommodate her 
osteoarthritis and depression despite her providing several doctor’s notes 
recommending that her workload be adjusted and tailored to account for her 
limitations.132 
 
 122. Id. at 487. 
 123. Id. at 489. 
 124. Id. at 488. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 492. 
 127. Id. (alteration in original). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.; see also Shivakumar v. Abbott Lab’ys, No. 99 C 7861, 2001 WL 775967, at *11 
(N.D. Ill. July 10, 2001) (holding that although plaintiff identified the accommodations she 
sought, she “[bore] responsibility for failure to isolate the necessary specific accommodations” 
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doctors recommended and was not granted”). 
 130. 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 131. See id. at 1132–33. 
 132. Id.  In 2001, the Supreme Court held that the ADA does not permit state employees 
to recover damages against state employers because Title I of the ADA did not abrogate 
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Beck began working for the university in 1967.133  In 1991, she was 
assigned to the Department of Health Maintenance in the School of Nursing 
and began to suffer from osteoarthritis.134  In February 1992, Beck’s doctor 
recommended that Beck “avoid repetitive keyboard use,” which could “quite 
possibly” resolve her osteoarthritis symptoms.135  In May 1992, Beck was 
hospitalized for depression and anxiety.136  When she returned to work on 
June 9, 1992, her doctor wrote that “[s]he is to work one half day on Thursday 
and she is to work full days thereafter.  She has suffered recurrent major 
depression.  This is a serious medical illness and may require some 
reasonable accommodation so that she does not have a recurrence of this 
condition.”137 
The university requested access to her medical records, but Beck refused 
to sign a release.138  Following a July 1992 hospitalization, Beck returned to 
work and provided the following additional information from her doctor: 
Lorraine Beck has completed (9) days of hospitalization for depression and 
medication readjustment.  In returning to work on 8/10/92 she may require 
appropriate assistance with her work load.  An adjustable computer 
keyboard would be helpful in preventing further difficulties with her hands.  
All in all, tayloring [sic] her work load to what she & your staff feel she 
can realistically accomplish, would do much to assist in her transition back 
to work, and future productivity.139 
 
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 
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Olans Brown and Wendy E. Parmet identified several cases in which federal courts recognized 
disabled plaintiffs’ use of Ex parte Young “to obtain prospective relief against state officials.” 
Judith Olans Brown & Wendy E. Parmet, The Imperial Sovereign:  Sovereign Immunity & the 
ADA, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 15 & n.105 (2001) (citing, inter alia, Randolph v. Rodgers, 
253 F.3d 342 (8th Cir. 2001) and Frazier v. Simmon, 254 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2001)).  In 
Frazier, the Tenth Circuit held that Title I claims are cognizable under Ex parte Young. 254 
F.3d at 1254–55 (rejecting claims for prospective relief on grounds that the employee was not 
qualified).  In Randolph, the Eighth Circuit recognized a state prisoner’s Ex parte Young-based 
ADA Title II claim for prospective relief based on a request that he be provided with a sign-
language interpreter. 253 F.3d at 343, 348 (dismissing claims as against some named parties 
to the suit but allowing others to proceed). But see Seth A. Horvath, Note, Disentangling the 
Eleventh Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act:  Alternative Remedies for State-
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The assistant dean of the university’s nursing school informed Beck that, 
despite her doctor’s note, he did not understand what accommodations she 
needed and that Beck would work with him directly until additional 
information was received.140  Beck was moved to a small office with no 
windows.141  She received a wrist pad but not an adjustable keyboard.142  
Following a third medical leave, Beck requested a transfer to a different 
department but was denied.143  When she refused to report to her assigned 
department, she was terminated.144 
The court concluded that Beck obstructed the interactive process when she 
failed to release her medical records, which would have provided her 
employer with necessary additional information regarding exactly what 
accommodations she needed.145  Only the medical records could have 
“isolate[d] the necessary specific accommodations,” and because only Beck 
could provide access to the medical records, the interactive process 
breakdown was her fault.146  According to the court, “the University never 
knew exactly what action it needed to take.”147 
The court penalized Beck for failing to provide her employer with access 
to her complete medical records, even though not all of her records were 
likely relevant to her accommodation request.  Moreover, Beck might have 
had good-faith reasons to keep the entirety of her medical records from her 
employer.  Her physicians had presumably reviewed them and decided what 
kind of relevant information needed to be shared in their notes.  But Beck’s 
doctor’s notes did not suffice.  The court penalized Beck for withholding, 
during the accommodations process, records that she would have arguably 
been entitled to withhold during discovery and to move in limine to exclude 
at trial.  Beck has been cited frequently by courts rejecting 
failure-to-accommodate claims due to a disabled employee’s failure to 
provide sufficient medical documentation of their disability and 
limitations.148 
In Tatum v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania,149 the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania reached a similar result.  Joyce Tatum, a nurse’s 
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assistant, was fired following her refusal to lift heavy patients.150  Like Beck, 
she provided medical documentation of her disability—a cyst that caused her 
severe pain when she lifted heavy objects151—but the documentation was 
deemed insufficient.152  She alleged disability discrimination as a result of 
her employer’s failure to accommodate her disability.153 
Though Tatum’s responsibilities included lifting heavy patients, she was 
able to perform her essential job functions from 1973 until 1995 because the 
hospital provided her with lifting assistance.154  In 1994, Tatum informed her 
supervisor, Elizabeth Craig, that it was difficult to lift and pull “heavy” 
patients.155  Craig asked for a note, from Tatum’s gynecologist who had 
treated the cyst, to verify Tatum’s assertions.156  Her gynecologist, Dr. 
Parrot, wrote a note stating that “Mrs. Tatum is unable to lift or pull heavy 
patients.”157  Craig asked for more information from Parrot.158  Parrot, 
however, informed Tatum that “she did not need another note”159 and refused 
to complete a “Physical Capabilities Form” because Tatum “could work.”160 
Craig then suggested that Tatum take the form to the hospital’s 
occupational health department.161  There, a nurse practitioner refused to fill 
out the form.162  Craig next suggested that Tatum take the form to her family 
physician, Dr. Gratz.163  She returned to Craig and explained that Gratz 
would not fill out the form either.164 
On March 28, 1995, Tatum reported to work and told the evening 
coordinator that she could not lift heavy patients.  Tatum was informed that 
if she would not lift heavy patients, she should leave and would not be 
paid.165  Tatum left but reported to work the following day, at which time she 
was suspended for three days without pay.166  Nonetheless, she continued to 
work until August 1995 when she was terminated.167 
In rejecting her failure-to-accommodate claim and her suggestion that the 
hospital failed to participate in the interactive process, the court criticized the 
lack of information provided by Tatum: 
Dr. Parrot’s cryptic note of September 21, 1994 did not describe in detail 
the nature of the disability, its cause, whether the disability was permanent 
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or temporary, or what treatments plaintiff was receiving.  In short, the note 
did not provide sufficient information to determine whether the disability 
was protected under the ADA.  Furthermore, Dr. Parrot provided no details 
as to the restrictions needed to accommodate plaintiff’s disability.  For 
example, there is no information as to the amount of weight plaintiff was 
restricted from lifting.  The only clarifying information provided to Ms. 
Craig by plaintiff regarding Dr. Parrot’s opinion, was that Dr. Parrot 
indicated that plaintiff “could work.”168 
Moreover, the court characterized Craig’s repeated requests for medical 
documentation as evidence of the hospital’s good-faith participation in the 
interactive process.  According to the court, the hospital could not discuss 
what accommodations Tatum wanted because Tatum failed to provide 
“necessary medical information.”169  By contrast, the court lauded the 
hospital’s efforts, noting that it “gave plaintiff at least four opportunities to 
produce the required information.”170  According to the court, there was 
nothing more for the hospital to do, as the hospital was not required to 
negotiate “with a brick wall.”171 
But Tatum was not a brick wall.  She provided a note from a doctor who 
identified the relevant limitations:  Tatum could not lift or pull heavy patients.  
The hospital could have offered to provide Tatum with assistance any time 
Tatum believed that a patient would be too heavy for her to lift.172 
Additionally, courts have treated the failure to provide medical 
documentation of disability as suggestive of fraud.  In Mudra v. School City 
of Hammond,173 Linda Mudra, a high school teacher with thirty years of 
experience, was fired for absenteeism following her failure to report to work 
while suffering from depression.174  Acting on the recommendation of her 
physician Dr. Goodman, Mudra did not report to teach on August 20, 2000, 
the first day of the academic year, as she “needed some time off to test the 
medications [Dr. Goodman] was trying out on her to treat her depression.”175  
Mudra provided written instructions for a substitute teacher and gave the 
school a note from Dr. Goodman stating that she was “unable to return to 
work until further notice.”176 
On August 21, the school’s insurance coordinator asked Mudra for her 
medical records, but “Mudra did not want to bring her records to the school 
for privacy reasons.”177  On August 31, the school asked Mudra to be 
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examined by Dr. Kemp, a doctor selected by the school, who would provide 
a second opinion regarding Mudra’s illness.178  Mudra was examined by Dr. 
Kemp and gave him permission to discuss his findings with Dr. Goodman 
but did not give Dr. Kemp her medical records.179  Dr. Kemp concluded that 
Mudra suffered from generalized anxiety disorder and hypertension.180  He 
attempted, but was unable, to contact Dr. Goodman.181 
On September 29, the school informed Mudra that her failure to provide 
Dr. Kemp with the information he needed was “noncompliance with their 
request for a second opinion” and would result in loss of compensation until 
her medical condition was verified or until she reported to teach.182 
On October 16, Dr. Goodman sent the school another note stating that 
Mudra would not return to teach “until further notice.”183  On October 31, 
the school sent Mudra a letter stating that Dr. Goodman’s notes were 
“insufficient to explain her absence” and that she would not be paid unless 
she verified her medical condition or reported to work.184  On November 30, 
an additional doctor wrote a letter to the school on behalf of Mudra 
explaining that her absence was caused by “Major Depressive Disorder, 
Moderate.”185  In response, the school wrote Mudra and explained that she 
would need to obtain a second opinion from a doctor selected by the 
school.186  On June 4, 2001, Mudra was terminated after she refused to obtain 
the second opinion.187 
The court rejected Mudra’s failure-to-accommodate claim because she 
“did not engage in the interactive process.”188  According to the court, the 
interactive process “is supposed to aid an employer in determining the precise 
limitations resulting from a disability.”189  Here, the breakdown in the 
interactive process was Mudra’s responsibility.  Mudra “did very little to 
provide the school or its doctor with information from which they could make 
a reasonable assessment of what sort of accommodation would be 
necessary.”190  When the school made a “simple request for a second opinion 
regarding her depression,” Mudra “complied, but only partially.”191 
The court also rejected Mudra’s arguments that the medical examinations 
requested by the school were barred by the ADA.  The court acknowledged 
statutory and regulatory language requiring that medical examinations of an 
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employee be “job-related and consistent with business necessity.”192  Still, 
the court explained that “cases have held that asking for more information 
regarding the nature of an illness is part of the interactive process that is part 
of finding reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee.”193  The 
school needed to know “the nature and extent” of Mudra’s illness to know 
“who is going to be showing up to work.”194  Without the medical 
documentation, Mudra and other employees would have “an easy way of 
circumventing policies aimed at preventing absenteeism.”195  The court 
stated that “[t]his is especially true in light of the very limited amount of 
information that Mudra provided the School on her own.”196 
However, the school did have information regarding Mudra’s ability to 
work.  Dr. Goodman explained that she would be unable to work “until 
further notice” as a result of depression.197  Instead of requiring Mudra to 
submit to additional examinations, the school could have requested periodic 
updates regarding her ability to work.  Not every disability has a clear end 
date.  A disability that prohibits an employee from working “until further 
notice” is not necessarily a disability invented to evade work. 
C.  The Medical Documentation Mistake 
Courts treat a doctor’s assessment of disability as “critical” to the 
interactive process, finding that without it, “[a]n employer cannot be 
expected to propose reasonable accommodation.”198  A system in which 
doctors, but not disabled individuals themselves, are consulted to determine 
whether a disability exists and how it should be accommodated embraces the 
medical model of disability.  In such a system, disability only exists if a 
doctor has recorded its existence in medical records.  Requiring medical 
documentation of disability during the interactive process betrays the social 
model of disability on which the ADA rests and is inconsistent with 
legislative history and the EEOC’s own interactive process guidance. 
This inconsistency can be traced to guidance regarding an employer’s 
ability to require medical examinations and make disability-related inquiries.  
That guidance has developed separate from, and without reference to, 
interactive process guidance.  The medical examination and inquiries 
guidance endorses employer requests for medical documentation when those 
requests for documentation are made in response to an employee’s 
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reasonable accommodation requests.  As explained below, this guidance 
should be disregarded. 
The ADA treats medical examinations and inquiries as presumptively 
prohibited disability discrimination.199  An employer cannot require a 
medical examination or ask an employee whether the employee “is an 
individual with a disability” or how severe the employee’s disability is unless 
the examination or inquiry is “job-related and consistent with business 
necessity.”200 
Chai Feldblum, who played a leading role in drafting the ADA and served 
as legal counsel for the disability and civil rights communities in 
Washington, D.C., during the ADA’s three-year negotiations,201 has 
described the ban on medical examinations and inquiries as a “key aspect[]” 
of the ADA’s employment title.202  Pre-employment examinations could 
facilitate disability discrimination and thus needed to be curtailed.  Feldblum 
explains that “Congress sought to prevent employers from using 
pre-employment medical inquiries ‘to exclude applicants with disabilities—
particularly those with so-called hidden disabilities such as epilepsy, 
diabetes, emotional illness, heart disease, and cancer—before their ability to 
perform the job was even evaluated.’”203  For example, if an employer asked 
a candidate if they were being treated for cancer, the employer might choose 
to immediately rely on the cancer-related information to reject the candidate. 
When a disability is “identified early in the application process,” it “taints the 
remainder of the application process.”204 
A current employee also should not be required to submit to medical 
examinations and inquiries.  As Feldblum noted, employees’ actual 
performance, as opposed to information about their health, “is the best 
measure of [their] ability to do the job.”205  As a result, the ADA provides 
that an employee who uses increased amounts of sick leave or appears sickly, 
for example, cannot be required to submit to an examination that would test 
her “for AIDS, HIV infection, or cancer,” unless the “testing is job-related 
and consistent with business necessity.”206 
Relevant regulations repeat the ADA’s requirement that medical 
examinations and inquiries of current employees must be job-related and 
consistent with business necessity.207  The regulations also contemplate how 
the information acquired through permitted examinations and inquiries may 
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be used, explaining that “[s]upervisors and managers may be informed 
regarding necessary restrictions on the work or duties of the employee and 
necessary accommodations.”208  They do not otherwise link medical 
examinations and inquiries to the interactive process. 
EEOC guidance goes further.  It identifies three circumstances in which 
medical examinations and inquiries of employed individuals are 
“[s]pecifically [p]ermitted.”209  First, “fitness for duty exams” are 
permissible “when there is a need to determine whether an employee is still 
able to perform the essential functions of his or her job.”210  Second, 
employers may require “periodic physicals to determine fitness for duty or 
other medical monitoring if such physicals or monitoring are required by 
medical standards or requirements established by Federal, State, or local law 
that are consistent with the ADA.”211  Third, employers may “make inquiries 
or require medical examinations necessary to the reasonable accommodation 
process described in” the regulations implementing the ADA.212  Yet the 
“reasonable accommodation process” is the interactive process, which has its 
own specific guidance and does not mention examinations and inquiries.213  
Guidance that allows employers to require employees to undergo medical 
examinations or answer medical inquiries regarding disability is inconsistent 
with the informal vision of the interactive process. 
Nevertheless, in 2000, the EEOC provided additional guidance regarding 
disability-related inquiries and medical examinations and again justified 
injecting them into the interactive process.214  Inquiries and examinations 
that “follow up on a request for reasonable accommodation when the 
disability or need for accommodation is not known or obvious” may be 
“job-related and consistent with business necessity.”215  It specified exactly 
when the request would satisfy the standard:  “when the disability or the need 
for the accommodation is not known or obvious.”216  In that case, an 
employer can ask the employee for “reasonable documentation about [the] 
disability and its functional limitations that require reasonable 
accommodation.”217 
As a result of this guidance, medical documentation requests will almost 
always be job-related and consistent with business necessity.  Disability is 
not well understood.  Whether disabilities are visible, invisible, common, or 
rare will depend on an employer’s own subjective understanding of 
disability.  An employer who has never experienced disability will likely treat 
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most disabilities as unknown and therefore in need of documentation.  Very 
few, if any, will be considered obvious.218  Thus, the guidance opens the door 
to an interactive process in which requests for medical documentation are the 
norm. 
The guidance also encourages employers and courts to be suspicious about 
an employee’s assertions that they are disabled.  The guidance permits 
medical documentation requests because an employer “is entitled to know 
that an employee has a covered disability that requires a reasonable 
accommodation.”219  That is, employees’ accounts of their disabilities are 
never enough. 
The EEOC’s guidance sets demanding standards for the documentation 
that an employee must provide.  The documentation must describe “the 
nature, severity, and duration of the employee’s impairment, the activity or 
activities that the impairment limits, and the extent to which the impairment 
limits the employee’s ability to perform the activity or activities” and 
substantiate “why the requested reasonable accommodation is needed.”220  
Requiring such detailed documentation converts the interactive process into 
a complicated and adversarial negotiation that is more akin to the discovery 
phase of litigation than an informal process intended to result in an 
accommodation that each party endorses. 
The guidance has shaped reasonable accommodation decisions.  Courts 
have relied on it to conclude that employees who fail to provide medical 
documentation to support reasonable accommodation requests have caused 
the interactive process to fail and cannot claim that their employers failed to 
accommodate them.221  The guidance has been relied on to justify requests 
 
 218. Courts acknowledge that “[a]n individual seeking accommodation need not provide 
medical evidence of her condition in every case,” including cases in which the disability is 
obvious. Ward v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 24, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  However, courts generally 
identify only one example of obvious disabilities:  those involving wheelchair users. See, e.g., 
id.; J.H. ex rel. J.P. v. Bernalillo County, No. CIV 12-0128, 2014 WL 3421037, at *113 
(D.N.M. July 8, 2014) (characterizing a paraplegic wheelchair user’s disability as “obvious”), 
aff’d, 806 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2015); Sabal Palm Condos. of Pine Island Ridge Ass’n. v. 
Fischer, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (describing the obviously disabled person 
as “someone confined to a wheelchair”).  Unless an individual uses a wheelchair, and the 
accommodation relates to the wheelchair, disabilities will likely require documentation. See 
Ward, 762 F.3d at 31 (stating that “an employer needs information about the nature of the 
individual’s disability and the desired accommodation—information typically possessed only 
by the individual or her physician”).  Indeed, in light of the discretion the interpretive guidance 
gives employers who seek medical documentation and assumptions that people with 
disabilities are faking their disabilities, even individuals who use wheelchairs might be 
required to prove their disabilities. 
 219. Enforcement Guidance, supra note 214, at *9. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See, e.g., Hoskins v. GE Aviation, No. 17-CV-224, 2019 WL 1339246, at *7 (N.D. 
Miss. Mar. 25, 2019) (citing Enforcement Guidance, supra note 214, at *10); Turcotte v. 
Comcast Cable Commc’ns Mgmt., LLC, No. 17-cv-150, 2019 WL 635409, at *13 (D.N.H. 
Feb. 14, 2019) (citing Enforcement Guidance, supra note 214, at *9), appeal dismissed, No. 
19-1438, 2019 WL 5598352 (1st Cir. July 3, 2019); Tavares v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. of R.I., 
C.A. No. 13-521, 2016 WL 7468130, at *18 (D.R.I. June 16, 2016) (citing Enforcement 
Guidance, supra note 214, at *9), report and recommendation adopted, C.A. No. 13-521, 2016 
WL 6988812 (D.R.I. Nov. 29, 2016); Heit v. Aerotek Inc., No. C15-1805, 2016 WL 6298771, 
2021] DISABILITY WITHOUT DOCUMENTATION 85 
for medical documentation establishing that an employee is disabled, as well 
as requests for doctors’ notes identifying which accommodations, if any, 
must be provided.222  One court characterized disabled employees who do 
not provide medical documentation during the interactive process as 
unreasonable.223 
The guidance has also led employers to draft policies and forms which 
treat medical documentation as a mandatory prerequisite to any kind of 
reasonable accommodation.  The University of California, which employs 
the largest proportion of the state’s workforce,224 illustrates this trend. 
The University of California has drafted a policy and procedures 
governing the interactive process.225  The relevant policy provides that 
“[w]hen the University requests that the employee provide documentation 
from the employee’s health care provider to confirm that the employee has a 
disability and to identify the employee’s functional limitations, the employee 
has an obligation to promptly comply with such requests.”226  Moreover, the 
University of California may determine that the information provided by an 
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employee is insufficient; if confirmation is necessary, “the University may 
require that the employee be examined by a University-appointed licensed 
healthcare provider.”227 
Publicly available human resources material and forms indicate that the 
University of California treats medical documentation of disability as a 
mandatory part of the interactive process.  The University of California 
Office of the President, for example, has created a chart identifying “[t]he 
employee’s role” in the reasonable accommodation process.228  An employee 
must “[r]equest job accommodation.”229  Under a column labeled “How to 
do it,” the chart states that an employee must “[p]rovide Accommodation and 
Leave Services with a written licensed healthcare provider’s statement 
describing your job-related limitations.”230  The health care provider, not the 
employee, “will identify if limitations are temporary or permanent.”231 
At UC Santa Barbara, the “Process to Request Workplace 
Accommodations” requires an employee to “have their medical provider fill 
out The Medical Response for a Reasonable Accommodation Request 
form.”232  The interactive process does not commence until the “supporting 
medical information” has been received.233  The Medical Response form 
requires a “Physician” or “Medical Provider” to determine whether the 
employee has a disability; identify the disability’s duration; identify “specific 
work restrictions and/or functional limitations” and how long the restrictions 
will “be in place”; and list the job functions the employee is “having trouble 
performing because of the limitation(s).”234  Finally, it asks the individual 
completing the form if they have “any suggestions as to possible 
accommodation(s).”235 
At UC Davis, managers and supervisors track reasonable accommodations 
that are made for employees on forms that require them to identify the 
medical documentation the employees have submitted from their 
physicians.236  At UCLA, employees seeking reasonable accommodations 
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must complete a form which instructs them to “attach any current medical 
documentation that describes [their] functional limitations.”237  The form 
makes clear that the documentation “will be requested as part of the 
interactive process,” even if it is not available at the time the employee 
submits the form.238 
At UC Santa Cruz, medical documentation is mandatory.239  An employee 
“must complete a medical release form” to permit UC Santa Cruz’s 
“Disability Management Coordinator” to communicate with the employee’s 
healthcare provider.240  Moreover, UC Santa Cruz may question the 
documentation itself and require that “a University-appointed licensed health 
care provider” verify its accuracy.241 
UC Santa Cruz has set up a multistep reasonable accommodations process.  
It requires the participation of a licensed health care provider and the 
execution of a medical release form.  And, UC Santa Cruz may reject what 
the employee provides.  The university permits its own health care provider 
to “verify” whatever the employee provides. 
As described, UC Santa Cruz’s reasonable accommodations process is 
time-consuming.  By contrast, the University of California’s religious 
accommodations process is a breeze.  To request a religious accommodation 
from flu vaccine mandates, University of California employees must identify 
their “sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance” that informs 
their accommodation request and explain how the belief, practice or 
observance “conflicts with the University’s flu vaccine mandate.”242  No 
documentation is required.  No expert must vouch for the employees’ 
representations.  No university-affiliated expert can challenge what the 
employees represent. 
Injecting medical documentation into the interactive process has a 
tremendous impact at the University of California and beyond.  To obtain a 
reasonable accommodation, disabled employees must have access to a 
medical provider—often a doctor—who can verify and document their 
disabilities.  Medical providers may be asked to describe an employee’s 
disability, to suggest accommodations and their duration, or both.  Not all 
 
s/2949v02huhx6qkjyndy45csh0za7i0gj [http://perma.cc/HK6P-MD7Y] (last visited Aug. 9, 
2021). 
 237. See Request for Reasonable Accommodation, UNIV. OF CAL., L.A. INS. & RISK MGMT., 
https://ucla.app.box.com/v/reasonable-accomm-request-form [https://perma.cc/F6RF-B4EL] 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2021) (typeface altered). 
 238. Id. (typeface altered). 
 239. Staff Human Resources:  Reasonable Accommodation, UNIV. OF CAL., SANTA CRUZ, 
https://shr.ucsc.edu/procedures/reasonable_accomodation/index.html 
[http://perma.cc/3WGU-G82T] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021) (“Medical documentation from a 
licensed health care provider must be provided by the employee to assist in understanding the 
nature of the employee’s functional limitations.”). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Employee Religious Accommodation Request Form (Accommodation to Flu Vaccine 
Mandate), UNIV. OF CAL., https://hr.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/employee_religious_ 
accommodation_request_form_for_flu_vaccine_mandate_berkeley.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/5C3G-CTEG] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021). 
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medical providers are familiar with their patients’ workplaces or their 
patients’ work.  When the doctors make accommodations suggestions, they 
may guess the type of accommodations that would be best suited to their 
patients’ needs or provide incomplete or vague recommendations that 
employers need not follow. 
Individuals with disabilities are so sidelined that they may be prohibited 
from transmitting medical documentation of disability to their employers 
directly.  For instance, UC Santa Barbara requires health care providers to 
send medical documentation of disability directly to the university,243 as 
though employees cannot be trusted to deliver their own medical records 
without altering them. 
Medical documentation requirements endorsed by the guidance may make 
reasonable accommodations impossible for some employees to obtain, and 
there is no guidance for employees who lack health insurance.  Similarly, 
there is no guidance for employees whose physicians either have no idea 
whether an employee is disabled for purposes of the ADA or cannot 
determine the kind of accommodations that would be most appropriate in a 
particular workplace.  The guidance also offers no solution for employees 
whose physicians refuse to complete a form documenting disability or 
suggesting accommodations or who charge fees that employees cannot pay.  
These are foreseeable obstacles, yet the guidance does not address them. 
This Article’s recommendation to disregard guidance endorsing medical 
documentation requirements is not a lofty policy goal.  Rather, it is rooted in 
fundamental principles governing agency action. 
EEOC interpretive guidance does not receive “full Chevron deference”244 
but may instead be entitled to less deferential respect,245 as established in 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.246  Agency guidance documents generally reflect “a 
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance.”247  However, agency guidance is not entitled 
to even Skidmore deference248 when it contradicts congressional intent249 or 
 
 243. UNIV. OF CAL., SANTA BARBARA HUM. RES., supra note 234. 
 244. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
“directs courts to accept an agency’s reasonable resolution of an ambiguity in a statute that 
the agency administers.” Michigan v. E.P.A., 576 U.S. 743, 751 (2015). 
 245. Richardson v. Chi. Transit Auth., 926 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed. 
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008)).  But see Flake, supra note 41, at 78–
79 (concluding that the EEOC’s interactive process guidance is consistent with the ADA’s 
legislative history and is therefore entitled to Chevron deference). 
 246. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 247. Richardson, 926 F.3d at 889 (quoting Fed. Express Corp., 552 U.S. at 399). 
 248. Kent Barnett et al., Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 
1526 n.11 (2018) (defining “Skidmore deference” as a review in which “the courts retain 
interpretive primacy” but “defer to an agency’s interpretation based on several factors, 
including the thoroughness of the agency’s interpretation and its consistency with the agency’s 
prior pronouncements”). 
 249. See, e.g., Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1221–22 (N.D. Ala. 2016), 
aff’d, 707 F. App’x 641 (11th Cir. 2017); Bull v. United States, 479 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
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“a regulation’s plain language.”250  Agency guidance that is internally 
inconsistent also carries little weight.251 
The EEOC’s medical examination and inquiries guidance, which permits 
employers to require that employees provide extensive and detailed medical 
documentation in connection with a reasonable accommodations request, 
should be disregarded for two reasons.  First, it contradicts the ADA’s clear 
legislative intent.  The ADA’s drafters described an interactive process that 
relied on an employee’s expertise and accommodations preferences, not the 
expertise of a health care provider’s recommendations.  If the employer and 
employee cannot settle on an acceptable accommodation, then the legislative 
history suggests the employer consult with “various employment agencies 
familiar with the needs of disabled workers.”252  Moreover, the guidance’s 
resort to medicine and medical records betrays the ADA’s rejection of the 
medical model of disability. 
Second, the medical documentation guidance is inconsistent with the 
agency’s own interactive process guidance.  Like relevant legislative history, 
interactive process guidance instructs employers to consider the employee’s 
own accommodations preferences.  If additional assistance is needed, then 
technical expertise should be sought from the EEOC itself, “[s]tate or local 
rehabilitation agencies, or from disability constituent organizations.”253  
Interactive process guidance makes no reference to medical 
documentation.254 
Thus, to the extent the EEOC’s guidance surrounding medical 
examinations and inquiries conditions the receipt of reasonable 
accommodations on medical documentation of disability or a health care 
provider’s recommendations regarding which accommodations are 
necessary, courts and employers should disregard the guidance. 
II.  ACCOMMODATION WITHOUT DOCUMENTATION 
This part first explores how existing scholarship characterizes the 
interactive process as a positive exchange of information between employees 
and employers.  Yet, in practice, medical documentation requirements strip 
the interactive process of its original collaborative purpose.  This part next 
turns to religious accommodations, focusing on how employers and courts 
do not meaningfully question an employee’s assertion that they hold certain 
religious beliefs.  It considers a similar hands-off approach to employees’ 
assertions that they are disabled.  It envisions reasonable accommodations 
that defer to employees’ understandings of their own disabilities and 
identities and the accommodations the employees recommend. 
 
 250. Springfield Parcel C, LLC v. United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 163, 184 (2015). 
 251. See Jones, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 1221–22. 
 252. Mayerson, supra note 21, at 516. 
 253. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., § 1630.9 (2020) (describing the “Process of Determining 
the Appropriate Reasonable Accommodation”). 
 254. See id.  The related “Reasonable Accommodation Process Illustrated” also makes no 
mention of medical documentation. See id. 
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A.  Accommodation Theory 
Scholars generally praise the interactive process, treating it as one that 
facilitates collaboration and leads to reasonable accommodations suitable to 
both employers and employees.255  Dallan Flake’s study of how the ADA’s 
interactive reasonable accommodations process differs from Title VII’s 
religious accommodations framework is instructive.256 
Flake argues that the interactive process allows for more significant 
employee involvement257 and also permits employers and employees to 
“work together in good faith.”258  When an employee participates 
meaningfully in the accommodations process, he explains, it is more likely 
that the employee will receive “a suitable accommodation.”259  The 
interactive process allows the employee to “discuss with the employer his 
precise job limitations and also suggest potential accommodations the 
employer may not have otherwise considered.”260  Therefore, even when an 
accommodation is denied on the basis of being unreasonable, “the interactive 
process can provide the employee with greater confidence that the 
employer’s decision was justified because the employer properly solicited 
and considered the employee’s input.”261  That is, the interactive process’s 
inherent fairness can soften the blow of an accommodations denial.262 
Flake describes how employers benefit from the interactive process.  
Employers and employees share responsibility for the ultimate 
accommodation decided.263  Flake contends that, as a result, the interactive 
process will either decrease the risk of litigation or better position an 
employer, who has participated in good faith, to prevail.264  Flake goes as far 
 
 255. See, e.g., Stacy A. Hickox & Angela Hall, Atypical Accommodations for Employees 
with Psychiatric Disabilities, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 537, 573–75 (2018); Susan D. Carle, Analyzing 
Social Impairments Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1109, 1142 (2017); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, 
and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 4–5 (1996).  Elsewhere, Hickox has taken 
a more critical approach, noting that the interactive process requires employees to reveal 
otherwise hidden psychiatric disabilities. See Hickox & Case, supra note 77, at 573.  The fear 
of stigma and stereotypes may deter employees with psychiatric disabilities from seeking 
reasonable accommodations, depriving them of the adjustments that would render their 
workplaces accessible. Id. at 536–37 (“[M]any employees and applicants with disabilities are 
still reluctant to reveal their disability, even if it means foregoing their right to reasonable 
accommodations.”).  Hickox and Case conclude that courts have endorsed arguably overbroad 
requests for medical documentation of employees’ disabilities and suggest mitigating 
measures, including prohibiting employers from seeking employees’ entire medical records. 
Id. at 588.  They do not, however, question the validity of medical record requests. 
 256. Flake, supra note 41. 
 257. Id. at 69–70. 
 258. Id. at 69. 
 259. Id. at 70. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Though not central to Flake’s thesis, this conclusion does not consider that employees 
may be terminated if they cannot perform a job’s essential function without accommodation.  
Terminated employees will not find comfort in knowing that the interactive process solicited 
their input. 
 263. Flake, supra note 41, at 70. 
 264. Id. 
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as suggesting that the interactive process “can boost employee morale, and 
in turn, productivity.”265  Flake concludes that religious accommodations 
should also involve an interactive process.266 
Flake’s survey of interactive process cases includes those that require 
employees to submit medical information or documentation requested by an 
employer.267  He explains that courts have held that “the employee has a duty 
to cooperate with the employer throughout the interactive process,” and that 
when employees fail to do so, their accommodation claims are dismissed.268  
Flake describes the holding in Ali v. McCarthy,269 in which an employer 
failed to accommodate environmental allergies because the employee failed 
to provide medical documentation beyond a “six-year-old doctor’s note” and 
a “copy of a prescription he previously submitted.”270  In Ali, Flake writes, 
the employer’s request for additional information “was highly reasonable and 
[the court found] that it was Ali who abandoned the interactive process by 
refusing to cooperate.”271  Flake also explains that courts fault employees for 
“break[ing] off the interactive process prematurely.”272 
Flake identifies Ward v. McDonald273 as an example of a case in which 
the employee was responsible for the early failure of the interactive 
process.274  In Ward, the employee failed to provide her employer with 
precise information from her doctors regarding “what accommodation she 
needed and whether she could even perform the essential functions of her 
job.”275 
Flake’s account of the interactive process’s origins is detailed and 
instructive.  He describes relevant legislative history and regulations, as well 
as courts’ uniform requirement that employers and employees engage in the 
interactive process.  I appreciate, and indeed rely on, Flake’s account of the 
interactive process’s legislative and regulatory history.  However, whereas 
Flake assumes that the interactive process functions as intended, I conclude 
that, in practice, the interactive process is a failure, and I take a critical 
approach to cases like Ali and Ward. 
 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 71.  Flake has drawn additional thoughtful connections between religious 
accommodations and disability accommodations, arguing, for example, that those who 
experience discrimination because they are regarded as holding certain religious beliefs should 
receive the same protection as the ADA affords those who experience discrimination because 
they are mistakenly perceived as being disabled. Dallan F. Flake, Religious Discrimination 
Based on Employer Misperception, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 87, 89–90.  Religious discrimination 
and disability discrimination are both “intentional and harmful”; therefore, 
misperception-based discrimination, whether rooted in religion or disability, should always be 
prohibited. Id. at 108. 
 267. See Flake, supra note 41, at 96–97. 
 268. Id. at 96. 
 269. 179 F. Supp. 3d 54 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 270. See Flake, supra note 41, at 97 (citing Ali, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 68–69). 
 271. Id. at 97. 
 272. Id. at 98. 
 273. 762 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 274. See Flake, supra note 41, at 96–97. 
 275. Id. (citing Ward, 762 F.3d at 33). 
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This Article highlights how the interactive process is in fact not guided by 
an employee’s own understanding of which accommodations are best.  
Rather, disability only exists if a medical provider, most often a doctor, says 
it does.  A doctor, not an employee, must suggest the appropriate 
accommodation.  Rather than empowering, the interactive process is 
exhausting. 
As explained herein, the interactive process imposed on disabled 
employees is burdensome and betrays the ADA’s purpose.  The interactive 
process must be fixed before it is applied in another context.  However, there 
are meaningful connections to be drawn between disability accommodations 
and religious accommodations.  As explained below, the religious 
accommodations process accepts an employee’s stated reason as to why an 
accommodation is necessary.  Disability, of course, is questioned.  Perhaps 
it, too, should be subject to a deferential hands-off approach. 
B.  The Hands-Off Approach to Religious Beliefs 
In 1972, Title VII was amended to require employers to accommodate 
their employees’ sincerely held religious beliefs, including all aspects of 
employees’ religious observances and practices, so long as the 
accommodations would not cause the employers undue hardship.276  The 
amendment responded to employers’ refusals to hire or accommodate 
employees whose religious practices required them to abstain from working 
on certain days.277  It was intended to give employees in the private sphere 
the same rights the Constitution affords federal, state, and local employees, 
reaching both beliefs and religious observances, including those that involve 
missing work.278  As a result, Title VII protection extends to beliefs that 
require “missing work for Good Friday services and the Sabbath, wearing a 
Muslim headscarf or Hindu bindi, requesting excused absences for religious 
prayer based on atheism or for observance of the Wiccan New Year, and 
attending a Native American ritual ceremony.”279 
 
 276. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (defining religion to include “all aspects of religious 
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable 
to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance 
or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business”); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting employment discrimination); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (stating that “[t]he intent and effect of this definition was to 
make it an unlawful employment practice under [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)] for an employer 
not to make reasonable accommodations, short of undue hardship, for the religious practices 
of his employees and prospective employees”). 
 277. See Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality:  The Failure of the Religious 
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 362–64 (1997). 
 278. Id. at 369–71. 
 279. Kimberly D. Phillips, Promulgating Conscience:  Drafting Pharmacist Conscientious 
Objector Clauses That Balance a Pharmacist’s Moral Right to Refuse to Dispense Medication 
with Non-Beneficiaries’ Economic and Legal Rights, 15 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 227, 247 
(2011). 
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Between 1972 and 1980, courts and employers “often questioned the 
sincerity or validity of employees’ claimed beliefs.”280  Courts relied on Free 
Exercise Clause cases, following either Wisconsin v. Yoder’s281 willingness 
to recognize institutional religion but not personal preference, or United 
States v. Seeger282 and Welsh v. United States,283 which recognized not only 
beliefs sanctioned by organized religion but also “sincerely held beliefs that 
are religious in one’s own ‘scheme of things.’”284  The interpretive 
differences reflected a tension between courts that treated religious beliefs as 
compelled and immutable, dictated by institutions, and those that instead 
accepted that religious beliefs could be idiosyncratic and personal.285  The 
former did not extend Title VII protection to personal religious preferences, 
while the latter did, through a hands-off approach.286 
The EEOC revised its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion 
in 1980.287  The revisions were made “in response to public confusion 
concerning the duty of employers and labor organizations to reasonably 
accommodate the religious practices of employees and prospective 
employees,”288 and the guidelines endorsed the hands-off approach.289 
Current agency guidance instructs employers that they “should ordinarily 
assume that an employee’s request for religious accommodation is based on 
a sincerely held religious belief.”290  Employees’ representations regarding 
their religious beliefs and practices should be believed, the EEOC has 
explained, because “the employer may be unfamiliar” with the beliefs.291  
Indeed, beliefs may still be sincerely held religious beliefs even if “no 
religious group espouses such beliefs” or “the religious group to which the 
individual professes to belong may not accept such belief.”292 
 
 280. Engle, supra note 277, at 361.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Hardison 
defined undue hardship as “any burden on the employer that is ‘more than de minimis.’” Id. 
at 372 (quoting Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84).  This Article focuses on how employers and courts 
examine the status and identity that give rise to accommodation requests based on religion and 
disability.  A discussion of the difference between employers’ burden-based defenses to 
accommodation requests is beyond its scope. 
 281. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 282. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 283. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
 284. Engle, supra note 277, at 373 (quoting Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185 and Welsh, 398 U.S. 
at 339). 
 285. Id. at 373–74. 
 286. Id. 
 287. See Engle, supra note 277, at 385; see also Guidelines on Discrimination Because of 
Religion, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,610, 72,610 (Oct. 31, 1980) (codified as amended at 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1605.1 (2020)). 
 288. Engle, supra note 277, at 385. 
 289. Id. at 362. 
 290. Compliance Manual on Religious Discrimination:  EEOC Directives Transmittal No. 
915.063 (Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter “EEOC Compliance Manual”], http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
policy/docs/religion.html [http://perma.cc/8BHW-HL66]. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Drew D. Hintze, Mandatory Influenza Vaccination Policies in Colorado:  Are 
Healthcare Employees with Religious Conflicts Exempt?, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 27, 38 
(2013) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1). 
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Whether an employee’s religious belief is “sincere” is rarely in dispute.293  
Certain factors might, however, undermine an assertion that a belief is 
sincerely held.  For example, sincerity might be called into question when:  
an employee “has behaved in a manner markedly inconsistent with the 
professed belief,” “the accommodation sought is a particularly desirable 
benefit that is likely to be sought for secular reasons,” and when “the timing 
of the request renders it suspect (e.g., it follows an earlier request by the 
employee for the same benefit for secular reasons).”294 
Still, the EEOC cautions that if an employee’s practice deviates from a 
religion’s commonly followed tenets, that alone is not grounds to doubt the 
sincerity of the employee’s beliefs.295  Also, because religious beliefs may 
change over time, “newly adopted or inconsistently observed religious 
practice may nevertheless be sincerely held.”296  An employer may seek to 
verify an employee’s stated beliefs, but the inquiry is only permitted “[w]here 
the accommodation request itself does not provide enough information to 
enable the employer to make a determination, and the employer has a bona 
fide doubt as to the basis for the accommodation request.”297  Further, such 
inquiry must be “limited.”298 
The EEOC provides a case-based example of circumstances that would 
justify a request for additional information: 
Bob, who had been a dues-paying member of [a union] for fourteen years, 
had a work-related dispute with a union official and one week later asserted 
that union activities were contrary to his religion and that he could no 
longer pay union dues.  The union doubted whether Bob’s request was 
based on a sincerely held religious belief, given that it appeared to be 
precipitated by an unrelated dispute with the union, and he had not sought 
this accommodation in his prior fourteen years of employment.299 
Under those circumstances, the union could require Bob “to provide 
additional information to support his assertion that he sincerely holds a 
religious conviction that precludes him from belonging to—or financially 
supporting—a union.”300 
Employees should provide information to resolve employers’ reasonable 
doubts.301  But the information need not be presented in a particular form, 
and an employee’s own “first-hand explanation” may alleviate the 
employer’s doubts.302  “[E]ven when third-party verification is requested, it 
does not have to come from a clergy member or fellow congregant, but rather 
 
 293. See EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 290. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. (citing Bushouse v. Local Union 2209, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. 
Implement Workers of Am., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1078 & n.18 (N.D. Ind. 2001)). 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
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could be provided by others who are aware of the employee’s religious 
practice or belief.”303 
As Zachary Kramer has explained, “religious discrimination law embraces 
an attitude of liberal neutrality toward the particulars of a person’s 
religion.”304  Just as the EEOC encourages employers to believe an 
employee’s representation that the employee holds a particular religious 
belief, courts resolving religious discrimination claims are also “reluctant to 
scrutinize an individual’s religious beliefs.”305  Outside of the employment 
context, the U.S. Supreme Court also follows the hands-off approach, 
“deferring to adherents’ characterizations of the substance and significance 
of a religious practice or belief.”306 
In addition to respecting the intimate nature of an employee’s religious 
practice, the hands-off approach to religious beliefs also simplifies the 
accommodations process.  It is a practical model. 
C.  The Hands-Off Approach to Disability 
This Article proposes borrowing only one aspect of the religious 
accommodations analysis:  the hands-off approach to employees’ assertions 
that they hold certain religious beliefs.307  The approach contends that 
employees’ representations regarding their disabilities should be treated the 
same way. 
The justifications underlying the hands-off approach to religious beliefs 
also apply to disability.  Just like religion, an employer may be unfamiliar 
with disability.  In the context of religion, the hands-off approach instructs 
that beliefs that are not held by an identifiable religious group still enjoy legal 
protection.  An employer may only have knowledge of disabilities that are 
visible, familiar, or experienced by an identifiable segment of the population.  
If an employee experiences disability in a way that the employer has never 
 
 303. Id. 
 304. Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 897 (2014). 
 305. Bushouse, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. 
 306. Samuel J. Levine, A Critique of Hobby Lobby and the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off 
Approach to Religion, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 26, 26–27 (2015).  However, the Court 
is not equally protective of all religions. See, e.g., Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. 
Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 80 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (comparing the Court’s 
application of strict scrutiny to pandemic-related restrictions on Catholic and Jewish houses 
of worship to its refusal to apply strict scrutiny to “a Presidential Proclamation limiting 
immigration from Muslim-majority countries, even though President Trump had described the 
Proclamation as a ‘Muslim Ban’”); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2439, 2433 (2018) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (comparing the Court’s treatment of perceived hostility directed at 
a baker’s Christianity to its decision to “leave[] undisturbed a policy first advertised openly 
and unequivocally as a ‘total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States’”). 
 307. It does not propose incorporating the definition of “undue hardship” in religious 
accommodations contexts.  An employer need not provide a religious accommodation nor a 
disability accommodation that causes an undue hardship. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, 
Accommodating Everyone, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 85, 89 (2016).  However, under the ADA, 
undue hardship “is defined as ‘significant difficulty or expense,’” whereas “in the religious 
discrimination context . . . the Supreme Court defined it to mean anything more than a ‘de 
minimis cost.’” Id. 
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seen before, the employer’s lack of knowledge should not trigger a 
documentation requirement. 
Of course, there are differences between disability and religion.  The free 
exercise of religion is a fundamental right expressly protected by the First 
Amendment.308  Disability discrimination by state actors only triggers 
rational basis review.309  However, Title VII reaches discrimination in 
private employment, using the Commerce Clause to go beyond state 
action.310  In that context, religious exercise and accommodations for 
religious practice lose their constitutional dimension.  Therefore, borrowing 
one aspect of religious accommodations law does not transplant heightened 
scrutiny to disability discrimination.  Rather, it applies a reasonable fix to a 
process in disarray.  Adopting the hands-off model currently applied to 
religious accommodations would result in an interactive process that 
proceeds based on employees’ own descriptions of their disabilities.  “I have 
diabetes” would suffice.  Employees would not need doctor’s notes or 
medical records to support their own assertions that they have diabetes. 
This would streamline and accelerate the interactive process.  First, it 
would eliminate time spent on collecting and reviewing medical records.  It 
would also avoid the expense created by medical documentation requests.  
Freeing reasonable accommodations from documentation requirements 
might also increase productivity.  Employees would no longer miss work to 
obtain medical documentation. 
The fear that people are faking their disabilities influences the legal rules 
surrounding disability, creating systems in which individuals who seek legal 
protection must go to great lengths to demonstrate that they are worthy of 
it.311  A system that requires extensive medical documentation may eliminate 
applicants who cannot obtain the documentation for a myriad of practical 
reasons that bear no relation to disability.312  If reasonable accommodations 
return to their informal roots, more employees with disabilities might be 
inclined to seek them out.  An interactive process that proceeds without 
medical documentation defers to employees’ experiences.  Accepting 
employees’ description of their own disabilities would convert the interactive 
process from one controlled by suspicion into one steeped in trust. 
To the extent that false claims of disability must be addressed, religious 
accommodations offer a solution that is also superior to the current disability 
practice.  The EEOC instructs that an employee’s assertion that religious 
 
 308. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). 
 309. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (stating that “States 
are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the 
disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational”). 
 310. Ioanna Tourkochoriti, Revisiting Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC:  The Road Not Taken, 49 
TULSA L. REV. 47, 82 (2013). 
 311. See generally Dorfman, supra note 3. 
 312. See Rabia Belt & Doron Dorfman, Reweighing Medical Civil Rights, 72 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 176, 179, 183–85 (2020) (describing the cost of medicalizing civil rights and 
explaining how “medical status acts as a gatekeeper to narrow the number of people who can 
utilize benefits and rights”). 
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beliefs are sincerely held should generally be accepted.  That is, the default 
is acceptance.  Disability should be treated the same way. 
However, there are circumstances in which an employer is entitled to ask 
for some documentation to support a religious accommodations request.  For 
example, when the timing of a request renders it suspect, an employer can 
ask for documentation to show that a religious belief is in fact sincere and 
that a related practice must be accommodated.  Still, the employer’s doubt 
has to be bona fide.  In the disability context, a request for documentation 
might be reasonable when an employee first asks for time off for vacation, is 
denied, and then repeats the request through the reasonable accommodations 
process, claiming that the time off is needed as a result of a disability.  The 
timing of such a request, not the disability itself, creates the need to 
investigate. 
Even when employers may ask for documentation of an individual’s 
religious belief, the documentation need not take any particular form.  In the 
religious accommodations context, an employer should consider an 
employee’s firsthand explanation regarding the employee’s beliefs.  To the 
extent third-party input is required, it need not come from a church official 
or church member.  In the disability context, an employee’s own detailed 
explanation of their disability should also suffice to relieve bona fide 
concerns.  Others familiar with the employee’s disability may also be called 
on to explain their understanding of the employee’s disability.  Expertise 
need not come from health care providers. 
Finally, employees must be able to suggest their own accommodations.  
Legislative intent is clear that disabled employees’ suggestions should be 
prioritized, as they reflect employees’ own disability expertise and are often 
the least expensive option.313  This, too, would avoid needless resort to 
medical documentation.  If an employee requests an ergonomic keyboard, a 
doctor who has never entered the employee’s workplace should not be 
required to endorse the keyboard request. 
Eliminating medical documentation requirements is an approach 
consistent with disability justice, which is sensitive to the law’s impact on 
marginalized individuals.314  Those who are unable to use paid leave to visit 
a medical provider to obtain medical documentation of disability are 
impacted by a documentation requirement.  The same is true of individuals 
whose doctors charge a fee to complete disability verification forms—a fee 
that the patient cannot afford to pay. 
It takes a certain amount of privilege to have the opportunity to discuss 
disability documentation with a health care provider, let alone actually obtain 
it.  Power dynamics between doctors and patients render that conversation 
difficult for some but not others, depending on, for example, the patient’s 
 
 313. See supra Part II.A. 
 314. “Disability justice aims to expand from the individual rights framework to highlight 
the impact of disability on certain populations, especially the poor, people of color, and 
women.” Seema Mohapatra, Politically Correct Eugenics, 12 FIU L. REV. 51, 78 (2016). 
98 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
race, gender, and class.315  Moreover, systemic racism is deeply embedded 
in U.S. health care.  Health care providers routinely disregard and undertreat 
the pain reported by people of color and by Black women in particular.316  A 
system that allows Black women to die from treatable conditions due to the 
suspicion that accompanies their self-reported symptoms is not one in which 
each individual has the same access to documentation that would suffice to 
prove disability.  To the extent that medical documentation requirements ask 
doctors to believe that the individual requesting the documentation deserves 
it, people of color will be disproportionately affected by concerns that 
disabled people are faking their disabilities.317 
Of course, abandoning medical documentation of disability is likely to 
cause great discomfort.  There will be outcries about floodgates and fakery.  
Failure-to-accommodate claims will be more likely to succeed and will 
trigger new guidance and training for employers accustomed to questioning, 
rather than accepting, disability.  But the ADA was intended to be radical, 
and radical change is uncomfortable.318 
Frank conversations about disability are in order.  But doctors do not need 
to mediate or even participate in them.  After all, doctors are not omniscient.  
They can diagnose and treat impairments, but they have no specialized 
knowledge of “the social and political conditions that place barriers in the 
way of . . . impairment[s]”—the very barriers that create disability.319  They 
may be ill-equipped to suggest accommodations in a workplace they have 
never entered and for work they have never observed. 
“In everyday interactions, people with disabilities have, and need more, 
opportunities to educate employers, agencies, and peers about their 
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experiences of disability.”320  As Carrie Griffin Basas explains, “people with 
disabilities need to be at the center of the ADA; it is their/our civil rights 
statute, about us, for us, and ultimately, an effort to be undertaken with us.”321 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has highlighted the agency guidance that led to the current 
documentation-dependent interactive process.  It also explained how medical 
documentation requirements conflict with the ADA’s legislative history and 
its purposeful abandonment of the medical model of disability.  It proposes a 
familiar and simple fix:  borrowing the hands-off approach already known to 
employers and courts who consider religious accommodations.  Lessening or 
eliminating medical documentation requirements will make reasonable 
accommodations less expensive, less time-consuming, and easier to obtain.  
It will also center employees’ own expertise, empowering people with 
disabilities to create their own solutions.  Guidance to the contrary should not 
be followed. 
Freeing disability from documentation requirements could also 
revolutionize how accommodation requests are treated in higher education in 
general and legal education in particular.  Laura Rothstein has highlighted 
unresolved issues surrounding disability documentation requirements 
imposed by the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC),322 state bar 
examiners, and law schools.323  For example, some law schools reject 
documentation of disability that they consider outdated, even when past 
documentation establishes that a student has a permanent disability.324  As a 
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result, disabled students must obtain and pay for new documentation,325 
which may require submitting to a battery of tests.326  When documentation 
can only be obtained following a medical appointment, students may miss 
class and waste valuable study time.327 
Law students with disabilities also face unique obstacles in connection 
with their bar exam preparations.  They must complete the same extensive 
paperwork as their peers in addition to paperwork related to their reasonable 
accommodations requests, including those that require medical 
documentation.  Inconsistent and untimely decisions regarding the 
administration of state bar examinations during the COVID-19 pandemic 
were particularly burdensome for students with disabilities.  Some students 
who received time-related accommodations were forced to choose between 
taking an accommodated examination in person or taking an 
unaccommodated test virtually.328  Students who sought accommodations for 
the first time as a result of, for example, their compromised immune systems, 
had to procure medical documentation on unforgiving timelines.  
Abandoning medical documentation requirements would improve the 
experience of students with disabilities who take the LSAT, law students with 
disabilities, and law graduates with disabilities. 
“Everyone who is born holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom of the well 
and in the kingdom of the sick,” and “sooner or later each of us is obliged, at 
least for a spell, to identify ourselves as citizens of that other place.”329  The 
same might be said of disability,330 with the COVID-19 pandemic serving as 
a very long spell in which our understanding of disability and identity 
evolved.  The pandemic not only highlighted the importance of streamlining 
the reasonable accommodations process, it created a new class of individuals 
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with chronic, long-term disabilities known as COVID long haulers.331  Long 
haulers experience the lingering effects of a COVID-19 infection long after 
they have recovered from it.332  And like so many disabled people, long 
haulers have already had their disability questioned.  The Wall Street Journal 
published an op-ed describing long-term COVID-19 as “largely an invention 
of vocal patient activist groups.”333 
I began this project in 2019, interested in uncovering the origins of the 
medical documentation requirement.  The project took on greater 
significance as people around the country struggled to convince their 
employers that because they are high-risk for serious illness from 
COVID-19, they must work from home.  Based on my own anecdotal 
experience assisting friends, students, and colleagues, employers did not 
relax medical documentation requirements during the pandemic.  And, 
perhaps due to political leanings, or sheer burnout, some doctors refused to 
back up a work-from-home request. 
How did it get this bad?  Cruelty may be the point—a system so intent on 
ferreting out fakery is not a system interested in access, let alone fairness.  I 
was not surprised to find evidence of imposing medical documentation 
requirements in the case law, but I was surprised that no scholarship 
challenges it.  I believe this is due to the relatively small number of people 
with disabilities in legal academia who also write about disability law.334 
The research undertaken in connection with this Article was inspired, in 
part, by my own experience with disability and reasonable accommodations.  
I am disabled due to a decades-long battle with rheumatoid arthritis (RA).  
My medical records could fill a room.  Nevertheless, my reasonable 
accommodations requests have been delayed or denied for a myriad of 
reasons.  The State Bar of California originally denied my bar exam 
accommodation request to take off-the-clock stretching breaks, away from 
the exam itself.  The bar did not question my disability but rather rejected my 
accommodation submission because two different sets of handwriting 
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appeared on one of the forms documenting my RA.  On the form in question, 
I filled in my name and address, and my doctor filled in and signed the rest.  
That was unacceptable, and the form had to be redone on an accelerated 
timeline during the final, stressful weeks of bar exam study.  Before I had a 
name for it, I was experiencing the consequences of fear of the disability con. 
Another reasonable accommodations request denial bordered on the 
absurd.  I once asked an employer for a keyboard tray, which I needed due to 
range of motion limitations in my left elbow.  A keyboard tray renders 
computer work much more comfortable.  Without it, I must hold my left arm 
at an angle that causes me significant pain.  In connection with my keyboard 
tray request, I provided medical records establishing that I have RA, a disease 
that is not rare, and which is known to cause joint pain and limit the affected 
joints’ range of motion.  In other words, my disability, and my need for the 
accommodation, were obvious.  Still, the keyboard tray accommodation was 
denied because I did not produce a letter from my doctor stating that I needed 
a keyboard tray. 
At the time of my keyboard tray request, I had just moved to a new town 
in a rural part of the country.  I had yet to establish care with a local 
rheumatologist—the closest one was located nearly two hours away from my 
new home.  I did not know when I would find time to see a new 
rheumatologist.  After all, I had just begun my tenure-track career, and I 
wanted to spend my time preparing for class and writing scholarship.  I 
wanted to settle in.  I also did not want my first visit with a new provider to 
be monopolized by a conversation about accommodations. 
I tried to persuade my employer to give me a keyboard tray by sharing an 
x-ray of my left elbow and an accompanying radiologist’s report detailing 
the bone spurs and edema plaguing the joint.  But that, too, was not enough 
to secure a keyboard tray. 
Finally, a rheumatologist whose care I was no longer under agreed to sign 
her name to a letter stating something akin to “please provide Katherine 
Macfarlane with ergonomic office furniture.”  Soon after, the keyboard tray 
appeared.  In the interim, I worked without a keyboard tray while my elbow 
throbbed with pain.  I did not have the luxury of halting work until the tray 
arrived. 
My story is not unique.  Like many others, my accommodations have been 
hard fought.  Still, to understand just how broken our reasonable 
accommodations regime has become, you may have to first suffer through a 
denied accommodations request.  And even still, you need the fortitude to 
write about it. 
